

The Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy towards the Arab-Israeli conflict

APOSTOLOS AGNANTOPOULOS

PhD Candidate

Department of Political Science and International Studies

The University of Birmingham, UK

apoagna@yahoo.com

Abstract

Research on foreign policy Europeanisation has been rare and focused on the procedural rather than the substantive dimension. This paper aims to fill this gap by introducing a theoretical model, which is based on three building blocks: a constructivist understanding of foreign policy; the identification of four pathways of Europeanisation; and the specification of several mediating conditions of EU impact. The utility of this model will be illustrated through an examination of Greece's stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The main argument is that the Greek policy has evolved from an unequivocal support for the Arabs to a more balanced approach, which however falls short of being genuinely equidistant. In this process EU membership had constraining and socialising effects. On the substantive level the need to harmonise Greece's policies with the EU's external relations led to a *de facto* upgrading of Greek-Israeli relations at a time when Greece refused to recognise *de jure* the Jewish state. In addition the dissemination of EU policy philosophies and norms of appropriate behaviour, and, most importantly, the long term influence of EU membership of Greek national identity have provided Greek policy-makers with a different understanding of Greece's role in the region and therefore made redundant several traditional precepts upon which her pro-Arab inclination was based. On the procedural level, the familiarisation of national officials with the EU policy-making process has increased their willingness to accommodate the interests of their partners and also enhanced their ability to influence EU policies.

KEY WORDS: Europeanisation, foreign policy, constructivism, discourse, Greece, Middle-East,

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Introduction

Europeanisation has been a fashionable term in European studies over the last decade. Ever since Ladrech's pioneering study on the French constitutional arrangements and territorial relations (Ladrech, 1994), a prolific literature has attempted to develop an operational theory that would be able to account for the effects of European integration on member-states' policies, politics and polities (for overviews see Radaelli, 2003; Borzel, 2005). However, foreign policy has remained outside the scope of the Europeanisation agenda for some time. To the extent that foreign policy was included in Europeanisation studies, the inquiry was limited to the administrative adaptation incurred in foreign ministries as a result of the need to co-ordinate EU business, with little regard to the implications of EU membership on the substance of foreign policy. Arguably this neglect of foreign policy was due to the intergovernmental character of the European Political Co-operation (EPC) and the Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), which generated limited potential for EU influence. However, this perception has been misguided. To start with, many foreign policy analysts have recognised that an equation of foreign policy co-operation in Europe with the CFSP is limiting and propose to study European foreign policy as a system of governance comprising the EC's external relations, the CFSP and the national policies (see White, 2001). From this perspective the assertion that member-states have retained full control of their foreign relations is simply wrong, since the EC's external relations include one of the bastions of Community competence: the Common Commercial Policy (CCP). In addition, the advent of constructivist and critical theorising in the 1990s has diverted attention away from a thin conceptualisation of governance as a set of rules that regulate interaction to a thick understanding as a set of intersubjective meanings that lend people to regard certain actions as appropriate (see for instance the contributions in Jorgensen, 1997).

This paper aims to contribute in filling the gap in theorising about foreign policy Europeanisation (for other recent attempts see Torreblanca 2001; Vaquer i Fanes 2001; Major 2005; Wong 2006) by proposing a conceptual model which is based on three building blocks: a constructivist understanding of foreign policy, which aims to take into account the fact that national interests are not given but socially constructed and conceives of foreign policy change in terms of adjustment, transformation or replacement of a dominant foreign policy discourse; the identification of four

pathways through which European integration influences the substantive and procedural dimensions of national foreign policies; and the specification of several mediating conditions of EU impact which can be traced at the EU, domestic and external levels.

The utility of this model will be illustrated through an examination of Greece's stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict over an extended period which starts from the date of application for EU membership till the end of 2004. Based on an extensive review of secondary literature and an analysis of parliamentary debates and other primary documentation I will argue that the Greek policy has undergone a substantial evolution from an unequivocal support for the Arabs to a more balanced approach, which however falls short of being genuinely equidistant. In this process EU membership had constraining and socialising effects. On the substantive level the need to harmonise Greece's policies with the EU's external relations led to a *de facto* upgrading of Greek-Israeli relations at a time when Greece refused to recognise *de jure* the Jewish state. In addition the dissemination of EU policy philosophies and norms of appropriate behaviour, and, most importantly, the long term influence of EU membership of Greek national identity have provided Greek policy-makers with a different understanding of Greece's role in the region and therefore made redundant several traditional precepts upon which her pro-Arab inclination was based. On the procedural level, the familiarisation of national officials with the EU policy-making process has increased their willingness to accommodate the interests of their partners and also enhanced their ability to influence EU policies.

The paper is structured as follows: in the first section I elaborate my conceptual framework. The second section presents a historical overview, which seeks to identify patterns of continuity and change in Greece's stance towards the Arab-Israeli conflict. The third section evaluates the extent to which these changes can be attributed to the dynamics of Europeanisation. The fourth section examines the conditions that have facilitated or hampered the process of Europeanisation. The concluding section summarises the findings and attempts to trace the theoretical implications of the Greek case and explore some avenues for further research.

Theoretical framework

Foreign policy change: three levels

At the heart of my approach to foreign policy change lays an understanding of foreign policy as a socially and discursively constructed activity. By this I do not intend to counter the conventional approaches, which perceive foreign policy in terms of objectives to be achieved and means for achieving them, and define foreign policy change as a continuum between a limited adjustment in the instruments used and a radical reorientation in the international role and activities of the state (see Holsti 1982; Hermann 1990; Rosati Hagan and Sampson 1994; Gustavsson 1999). My objective is simply to insert more reflexivity in these approaches in order to be able to account for the fact that the rationales behind foreign policy actions are based on particular societal representations of the world and therefore cannot be established by assumptions or through an individualistic understanding of ideas that attempts to trace decision makers' beliefs without regard to the social structure within which these beliefs are embedded (see Larsen 1997: 4-6).

In order to transcend the individualistic understanding of ideas I use the term foreign policy discourseⁱ which I define as a set of socially constructed intersubjective ideas that establish a particular definition of national interests and specify strategies in order to achieve them. A foreign policy discourse is linked with a specific national identity, which is also a social construction reflecting intersubjectively shared perceptions of self and other. At a specific point in time a particular foreign policy discourse will become dominant and will therefore provide the framework of foreign policy in the sense of making certain actions intelligible and excluding others as inappropriate. The possibility of change in this model relies in the ability of alternative discourses to challenge the dominant one. More precisely I identify three levels of changeⁱⁱ:

- *Adjustment* of the dominant discourse which involves a limited change in the strategies used.
- *Transformation* of the dominant discourse, which involves the introduction of new strategies to achieve the specified national interests.
- *Replacement* of the dominant discourse, which entails a different understanding of national interests and therefore involves a change in national identity (i.e. the dominant societal representations of self and other).

This transition from individual beliefs to discourse has important methodological implications, because it directs our attention away from a mental construction towards something that can be directly observed and in so doing disengages us from having to distinguish between intentions and rhetoric (Waeber 1998). This reading of documents might seem superficial if one's objective is to identify the 'real reasons' behind foreign policy actions, but it is very helpful for identifying the underlying intersubjective understandings that have made these actions possible.

Europeanisation and foreign policy: four pathways

The study of the impact of EU membership on national foreign policies is strictly speaking falling within the category of 'policy Europeanisation', which deals with the impact of EU membership on member-states' public policies and therefore could in principle be examined without regard to the effects on political actors (political Europeanisation), intersubjective understandings (societal Europeanisation) and public discourses (discursive Europeanisation).ⁱⁱⁱ However, from a constructivist perspective it is difficult to isolate the policy and societal dimensions, since these are interrelated. In order to be able to evaluate the different aspects of EU impact it is therefore necessary to develop a genuine and comprehensive model which is able to grasp all aspects of EU impact. This model is based on the identification of four pathways^{iv} of Europeanisation, which can be categorised along two dimensions. The first dimension distinguishes between the sources of EU impact, in particular whether it emanates from the setting up of a particular policy and institutional arrangement or involves the development and diffusion of ideas of appropriate policies and diplomatic practices. The second dimension concerns the level of EU impact, in particular whether EU membership affects the substance of foreign policy or the foreign policy-making process. It goes without saying that procedural changes will have an indirect influence on the substance of foreign policy.

The first pathway, which I shall call *substantive-regulative*, emerges when the EU prescribes a specific policy for member-states to follow. In this case change is the result of an adaptational pressure provoked by the incompatibility between this policy and national foreign policy priorities. The dynamics of change will therefore involve coercion and the decision to comply with EU requirements will rest on an instrumental calculation of costs and benefits. This pathway is reminiscent of the

‘goodness of fit’ approach, which has been employed in Comparative Politics and portrays to explain domestic change on the basis of the compatibility (fit) or incompatibility (misfit) between domestic and European arrangements (see Cowles *et al.* 2001). However, contrary to this approach I do not consider the existence of an intermediate ‘misfit’ as leading to more adaptation due to the counterbalancing of incentives (i.e. easiness of adaptation) and disincentives (cost of compliance). This is because fit and misfit are contested concepts that involve different interpretations and political conflict, and therefore they cannot be objectively established (Dyson and Goetz 2003: 16). This is not to say that the compatibility between domestic and European arrangements is unimportant but that it is essential to decompose it in components that are amenable to empirical measurement (see below). It is also important to note that the adoption of a specific foreign policy position is not a necessary condition for an adaptational pressure to emerge. The mere anticipation that the EU intends to take on a particular policy may induce member-states to modify their stance. Although this does not affect the causality between EU policy and national adjustment, the timeline of events is reversed. In fact, a modification of the national position is often a prerequisite for the adoption of a policy, especially when the decision-making rules provide member states with the right to veto.

The second pathway, which I shall call *substantive-constitutive* emanates from the establishment at the EU level of ideas regarding the conduct of foreign policy, which are then disseminated to member-states and provide them with a different understanding of their interests. These ideas might come in multiple forms, which vary in specificity. The most specific involves a process whereby new solutions to particular problems that emerge in the context of the EU, affect the perceptions and expectations of national foreign policy-makers and incite them to change their foreign policies accordingly. This process of ‘horizontal Europeanisation’ through ‘framing integration’ has been widely studied in the field of public policy, with reference to the EMU and the Open Method of Coordination (see Knill and Lehmkuhl 2002; Radaelli 2003), but I believe that it is especially relevant in the context of foreign policy, where co-operation is relatively informal, consensual and non-hierarchical (for a similar argument see Bulmer and Radaelli 2004: 7). Ideas might also take the form of norms that delimit the realm of legitimate foreign policy action. In the context of the EU these ideas can be said to derive from a set of general principles such as peace, liberty, democracy, rule of law and human rights, which are comprised in the EU

acquis and constitute the normative basis on which a collective European identity is constructed (Manners 2002: 242; Sedelmeier 2004: 128). Accordingly member-states are expected to follow these norms in their international relations in order to be considered as respected Europeans. Ultimately the construction of a European collective identity may lead to a change of member-states' self identification and a therefore a radical transformation of the central premises upon which their foreign policies are based. By this I do not mean that national identities are becoming obsolete and that national interests are replaced by European ones, but that a European dimension is increasingly incorporated into national identities and foreign policies. It is important to note that EU policy philosophies, norms and collective identity (even more that specific EU policies) do not constitute objective categories. Therefore they do not themselves cause a change in foreign policy. The actual cause of change is the emergence of a foreign policy discourse which legitimises a different course of action by making reference to 'Europe'. Although this discourse may make use of concepts that have first been formulated at the EU level, it is essentially a national construction. This has important methodological implications, because instead of tracing the process through which certain European ideas are internalised by member-states one should focus on how Europeanness is depicted in alternative representations of the Self and how the power relationship between these alternative representations has evolved over time.

The third pathway, which I shall call *procedural-regulative* refers to effects of EU membership on the foreign policy-making structures and processes. In the first place the existence of a supranational level of policy-making challenges the traditional view of foreign policy as the preserve of national governments but at the same time it may enhance national diplomatic capabilities, because of the increased information and prestige acquired by participating in it (Tonra, 1997). Moreover, EU membership may generate a substantial pressure for constitutional and administrative changes within member-states, which may affect the domestic institutional setting at three levels: the relations between state and society and between the different strands of government (executive, parliament, judiciary); the inter-ministerial balance, with foreign ministries acquiring more central political control, because of their role as coordinators of EU business, but at the same time, domestic ministries being able to develop their own external relations, thus challenging the role of foreign ministries as gatekeepers (Hocking & Spence, 2002; Manners and Whitman 2000); and the

organisation of foreign ministries through a substantial expansion in their size, but also a re-orientation towards Europe, manifested through the establishment of autonomous branches dealing with EU affairs (Smith 2000; White, 2001). On the whole the institutional restructuring incurred from EU membership will generate a change in the opportunity structures of foreign policy actors, and this might indirectly affect the substance of foreign policy by strengthening previously marginalised voices.

The fourth pathway, which I shall call *procedural-constitutive* stems from the socialisation of national officials to the EU's co-operative diplomatic culture, which emanates from the establishment of informal procedural norms (i.e. consultation with other member-states before adopting a position, consensual style of decision-making, secrecy of negotiations, respect of each others' national sensitivities, neutrality of the Presidency), the frequency of interactions and the familiarisation with its others positions (Hayes-Renshaw 1990; Glarbo 1999; Smith 2000, 2004). This can be said to influence the substance of foreign policy in two ways. First it increases directly the likelihood of adaptation because member-states feel normatively obliged to take into account the interests of the EU in the formulation of their foreign policies. For instance in the context of the EPC/CFSP the corpus of policies adopted throughout the years has established an *acquis politique*, which member-states generally follow even though they are not legally obliged to do so (Jorgensen 1997). Similarly member-states are expected to facilitate the decision-making process and refrain from abusing their institutional power in order to prevent unpleasant developments. This does not mean that the threat to veto a decision is never invoked, but that this is accompanied by a genuine effort to achieve a mutually acceptable solution. Second, by engaging in frequent consultations, seeking coalitions and expressing national interests in terms of European interests, national officials are able to influence the final decision to reflect national preoccupations. This in turn reduces the incompatibility between domestic and EU arrangements and therefore the cost of compliance with EU requirements.

Before proceeding to the conditions of Europeanisation one caveat is necessary. The pathways presented can be criticised for adhering to a top-down approach, which ignores the uploading dimension of Europeanisation (i.e. the exporting of national policies at the European level). The answer to such a criticism is that the inclusion of the uploading perspective would risk overstretching the meaning of Europeanisation (Radaelli 2003). The uploading of national policies is of course a

possibility and cannot be ignored in empirical research but I agree with Dyson and Goetz (2003: 20) who argue that it should be treated not as a defining but as an accompanying property of Europeanisation. In my model the uploading is incorporated as a possible outcome of procedural-substantive Europeanisation but also as a condition for substantive Europeanisation (see below).

Conditions of EU impact: EU, domestic and external

As mentioned earlier the third pillar of my framework specifies several mediating conditions of EU impact at the EU, domestic and international levels. On the basis of these conditions several tentative hypotheses can be advanced.

At the EU level, the pressure is likely to be higher in areas where member-states have relinquished significant competence to EU institutions and established legally *binding rules*. However, the absence of legal obligations does not mean a lack of enforcement since national governments may be subjected to a political pressure by their partners (i.e. isolation, threat of exclusion). Second, the level of pressure is likely to be lower if there is not *widespread consensus* among member-states and EU institutions, not only because it will be easier to block decisions but also because the need to combine different views is likely to compromise the specificity of the policy, thus providing more leeway for adaptation. Third, the level of pressure on a particular member-state will be lower if it has managed to *influence EU policies* in order to reflect national priorities (which is partly an effect of procedural Europeanisation).^v

At the domestic level I believe that the following factors are important.^{vi} The first can be named reform capacity and depends on the *strength of executive leadership* and the existence of *veto players* who oppose reform. The second is the mobilisation of *change agents* who might participate in the process of policy formulation and legitimisation. The third domestic factor is *timing*. From a macro perspective it is important to know the length of EU membership (with the expectation being that constitutive effects take longer to materialise) and whether the EU input precedes, follows or coincides with processes of domestic reform (with the latter case being the one where one should expect greater impact). From a micro perspective one should take into account specific events that may facilitate or hamper reform.

Conditions at the external environment are also very important. Following Vaquer i Fanes (2001) I argue that one should take into account the following factors.

Systemic changes such as the end of the Cold War, as well as more specific evolutions in the *regional* setting. The role of other *international actors*, be they states or international organisations (UN, OSCE etc.). Developments in the *target area* (country, region, organisation), including specific foreign policy actions as well as evolution in her internal situation.

Historical overview

Greece's foreign policy preferences in the Middle-East have traditionally been shaped by the interaction of four discourses: A historical discourse, which made references to the past in order to substantiate the existence of a special linkage between Greece and the Middle-East; a geopolitical discourse, which depicted the Middle-East as a big chessboard, involving regional and global players, and related Greek policies in the region with questions about the country's international orientation; a security discourse, which constructed the Middle-East as another field where the Greek-Turkish antagonistic relationship evolved; and a discourse on justice, which juxtaposed a positive image of the Palestinians as a heroic and small nation, which had been subjected to a fundamental injustice to a negative image of Israel as an expansionist state which had abused its supreme military power and the support conferred upon it from the international community, most notably the US, in order to impose its will to its Arab neighbours. In this section I investigate the evolution of the Greek policy vis-à-vis the Israeli-Palestinian conflict over a thirty years period, which spans from the day of application for EU membership in 1975 till the end of 2004. I will show that the interaction of these four discourses entailed a pro-Arab inclination, which has demonstrated a remarkable persistence despite the attempts of successive Greek governments to follow a more equidistant approach since the end of the Cold War.

The Cold War: Between moderate and radical pro-Arab positions

The pro-Arab predisposition of Greece's middle-eastern foreign policy dates back to the end of the Second World War. Greece was among the countries that voted against the 1947 UN Partition Plan for Palestine and refused to establish full diplomatic relations with Israel, until a comprehensive solution which would take into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people had been found. The result was the

consolidation of a climate of mutual suspicion between the two countries, which hampered the development of bilateral relations at the political and economic levels (Nachmani, 1987). At the same time Greek-Arab relations were cordial, with successive Greek governments consistently aligning with the Arabs on the Arab-Israeli conflict and endeavouring to deepen Greece's economic relations with the Arab world. This pro-Arab inclination emanated primarily from the need to appease the Egyptian government in order to preserve the status of the Greek community of Egypt. From the Greek perspective this community was considered as an integral part of the Greek nation, which constituted the living memory of its glorious past, and therefore its protection constituted a fundamental foreign policy responsibility, which overshadowed all aspects of Greece's middle-eastern policy. The advent of the Cyprus issue in the 1950s added a security dimension in Greece's foreign policy considerations, since the Arab vote in the UN was inaugurated to an important diplomatic asset, whose preservation merited the sacrifice of maintaining chilly relations with Israel. However, the Greek stance was not overtly anti-Israeli. Greece never questioned the right of existence of the Jewish state and despite the issuing of critical declarations it tacitly approved the use of its territory from the US military forces during the various wars that erupted in the region (Abadi, 2000). This moderation of Greece's pro-Arab inclination was related with a geopolitical discourse, which highlighted Greece's commitments as a member of the western alliance and therefore excluded policies that were incompatible with Greece's western orientation.

The foreign policy pursued by the conservative government of New Democracy after the collapse of the military regime in 1974 was clearly embedded in this tradition of moderate pro-Arabism. Although the massive departure of Greek citizens from Egypt, in response to the imposition of discriminatory laws by the Nasser regime, had removed the 'Diaspora issue' from the top of the Greek foreign policy agenda, the importance of the Arab world in Greek foreign policy considerations had not waned. In the first place the deterioration of the bi-communal conflict in Cyprus, after the Greek sponsored coup and the subsequent Turkish invasion and dichotomisation of the island, had reinforced the need to secure the Arab vote in the UN. In addition since the early 1970s we observe a widespread agreement that the 'historic Greek-Arab friendship' provided the foundation for the building of an ever closer Greek-Arab relationship based on common interests (Bitsios, 1983: 154-155). This

perception warranted the maintenance of a low profile in Greece's contacts with Israel, since an upgrading of Greek-Israeli relations would be interpreted as an act against friendship and therefore could jeopardise Greece's economic opening to the Arab world. In this context Greece reiterated her support for a comprehensive solution of the Arab-Israeli conflict and remained firm in her refusal to recognise Israel until the latter withdrew its army to the pre-1967 border and accepted to engage in negotiation with all the parties concerned, including the Palestinians. However, Athens did not raise objections to the step-by-step approach sponsored by the US administration, which had led to the 1979 Camp David accords between Egypt and Israel. Moreover, although the Greek government joined the other Arab states in recognising the PLO as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and allowed the organisation to open an information office in Athens, it also was eager to clarify that this did not amount to full diplomatic recognition and refrained from voting whenever the granting of special status to the PLO was discussed in the UN General Assembly (Chila, 1988: 371).

Greece's pro-Arab inclination became more obvious after the Pan-Hellenic Socialist Movement (PASOK) won the national elections and formed the first socialist government in Greek history. The Greek government intensified its contacts with the Palestinian leadership and, in a gesture of significant symbolic importance Yasser Arafat paid an official visit in Athens, during which the PLO office was upgraded to the level of diplomatic representation. Moreover, the PASOK government condemned the exclusion of the Palestinians from the Camp David agreement thus reversing the policy of silent approval which had been pursued by its predecessors. In addition, the cadres of PASOK were much more vocal than their conservative counterparts in their denunciation of Israel's policies and, during the war in Lebanon in 1982, the Greek prime minister Andreas Papandreou went as far as accusing publicly the Israeli government of imitating the crimes committed by the Nazis against the Jews during the Second World War (Greek Parliament 30/11/1982: 1474-1477). The perception that Greece's support for the Arabs tilted towards a more radical direction was reinforced by the occurrence on Greek soil of a series of terrorist incidents, which generated accusations that Greece was not doing enough in order to deter and punish international terrorists (Ioannides, 1991). This radicalisation of Greece's middle-eastern policy was linked with an anti-westernist discourse, which depicted Greece's unconditional attachment to the West as a 'primary source of the

country's political and economic hardships' (PASOK, 1974) and advocated a 'multidimensional foreign policy' that would take into account Greece's 'triple identity as a European, Balkan and Mediterranean country' (Greek Parliament 22/11/1981). From this perspective the Middle-East should constitute an autonomous sphere for the promotion of Greece's interests not merely a derivative of the country's effort to preserve its position in the West, as it had so far been the case. This alternative vision of Greece's international orientation tended to go hand in hand with a rejection of the distinction of the Arab countries in moderate and radical regimes (Roussos, 2003: 82). The Arab Nation which extended from Syria to Morocco constituted an important factor in world politics and the so-called radical regimes were 'the forefront of the anti-imperialist front' (Papandreou quoted in Elefantis, 1991: 169) and therefore Greece's natural allies.

Since the mid-1980s we observe a gradual rapprochement with Israel, which started with the exchange of visits between lower officials and culminated with the visit of the Greek Foreign Minister to Israel in November 1987 (Abadi, 2000: 65). The abandonment of the radical pro-Arab stance was also evident in the way Greece dealt with the international attempts to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. For instance despite the fact that it had previously endorsed the Fez Declaration Athens did not reject outright the proposal sponsored by the American President Ronald Reagan, which was depicted by the Greek Prime Minister as 'a step in the right direction' (Tsakaloyannis, 1984: 114). This shift in the Greek policy was related with two factors. In the first place the failure of Greece's economic opening to the Arab world to live up to the expectations (Xanthakis et al. 1989; Tsardanidis, 1992) generated disappointment and discredited the representation of the Arab World as an 'economic El Dorado'. As a result the image of Israel as a significant 'economic partner' started to antagonise the 'historic Greek-Arab relationship'. In addition the assumption that the perpetuation of the stalemate in Greek-Israeli relations was the inevitable cost that the country had to pay in order to secure the Arab vote on Cyprus was challenged not only because the Arab support had turned out to be less unequivocal than what Greece would have expected (Tsakaloyannis, 1984: 117) but also because of the concerns raised over the fact that Greece's pro-Arab positions had alienated her from the powerful Jewish lobby in the US and therefore had deprived the Greek diplomacy from a powerful weapon which had instead fallen in the hands of Turkey (Abadi, 2000: 61).

Post Cold War: Towards a more equidistant approach

The shift towards a more equidistant approach was consolidated after the end of the Cold War, with the *de jure* recognition of Israel, which led to a remarkable improvement of the diplomatic atmosphere between the two countries and sparked an unprecedented development of bilateral transactions. The advent of a new era in Greek-Israeli relations was reaffirmed in 1994 with the signing of a defence agreement which extended the co-operation between the two countries to a field that would have been unimaginable a decade ago (Zampouras, 2001). This Greek-Israeli rapprochement was of course accompanied by balancing moves towards Arab side, such as the upgrading of the Palestinian mission in Athens to the same level as the Israeli diplomatic representation and the promotion of a defence agreement with Egypt (Athanasopoulou, 2003). Moreover, Greek officials that paid official visits to Israel were taking care to meet with their Palestinian representatives and after the launching of the Peace Process Athens became an important source of financial assistance for the newly established Palestinian Authority (www.mfa.gr). However, the significance of the decision of the Greek government to defy the objections of the Arabs and take the Greek-Israeli relationship out of the cold cannot be overestimated. Apart from the aforementioned questioning of the effectiveness of the pro-Arab policies that had been followed until then, it also reflected a conviction that there was no fundamental contradiction between a Greek-Israeli rapprochement and the preservation of Greece's close relations with the Arab world (Greek Parliament 12/2/1991: 5977). Rather than being a diplomatic card the withholding of Israel's recognition was constructed as an outstanding technicality of the past, which had prevented Greece from grasping its full potential as the only country in the region that was a full member of western institutions (Greek Parliament, 25/5/1990: 304). As I will show below, this argument was warranted by a different representation of the Self, which implied a positive identification with Europe.

With respect to the substance of the Arab-Israeli conflict the Greek government has toned down its criticism against Israel and expressed its unreserved support for the various peace initiatives undertaken by the international community (Madrid Conference, Oslo Accords). Greece has also tried to mediate directly for the resolution of the conflict through the convening of a series of meetings between Palestinian and Israeli academics and lower officials. The so-called Athens Dialogue

was considered as a significant confidence building measure that would contribute to the main negotiation that was taking place under the auspices of the US (Kranidiotis, 2000: 329). Finally, Athens has adopted a more stringent stance with respect to terrorism by arresting and extraditing Palestinian activists suspected of involvement in terrorist activities (Kaminaris, 1999).

However, Greek-Israeli relations have not yet acquired the conviviality of the Greek-Arab relationship and the pro-Arab inclination in Greek perceptions of the Arab-Israeli conflict has demonstrated a remarkable stability. This became obvious after the breakout of the second *Intifanda* in 2000. Although the Greek government refrained from using the harsh rhetoric of the past, it nevertheless depicted Israel as the main responsible for the stalemate of the Peace Process and urged the Israeli government to ‘stop the building of the Security Fence’, which ‘confiscated Palestinian land’, ‘abandon the practice of extrajudicial killings’, which ‘led to the perpetuation of violence’ and ‘resume the negotiations with the Palestinian leadership’ (www.mfa.gr). This representation of the situation was also reflected at the societal level, where we observed an astonishing wave of solidarity to the ‘suffering Palestinian people’, coupled with a fierce condemnation of Israel and in particular the government of Ariel Sharon, which was accused of committing crimes against humanity (Athens News Agency, April 2002).

Continuity or change?

From the above overview it becomes apparent that Greece’s stance in the Arab-Israeli conflict has evolved substantially from an unequivocal support for Arab side to a more balanced approach, which however cannot be characterised as genuinely equidistant in the sense that the Greek discourse, both official and popular, tends to put the onus on Israel for the lack of progress in the Peace Process. The persistence of this pro-Arab bias might seem paradoxical if one considers the decline of the ‘historic Greek-Arab friendship’ (historical discourse), the loss of importance of the ‘Arab vote’ (security discourse) and the consolidation of Greece’s western orientation (geopolitical discourse). However, it is compatible with a discourse on justice, which depicts the dispute between the Palestinians and the Israelis, not as a reflection of colliding interests in need of compromise, but as the result of a fundamental injustice imposed upon a small nation whose land has been forcefully occupied and which has

been deprived of the right to self-determination. This discourse constructs a negative image of Israel as the main responsible for the conflict. Although the right of existence of the Jewish state is not put into question, the Greeks attribute the failure to reach a solution to the intransigent position of Israel, which carries on with its expansionist policy despite the widespread international condemnation. This negative image of Israel is corroborated by a positive image of the Palestinians as a 'brave nation' engaged in a 'just fight' for national liberation.

The construction of Greece's pro-Arab predisposition as an ethical stance is not the result of anti-Semitic feelings. Although the image of the Jew in the Greek discourse is sometimes inscribed with negative characteristics (Marketos, 1994; Margaritis, 2005), Greek anti-Semitism has been primarily inward oriented and reflects a suspicion with respect to minorities that have a sense of ethnic consciousness, rather than a general distrust for the Israelites. Instead the positive identification of Greeks with the Palestinians is sustained by the perception that the two peoples face a common fate, marked by 'national tragedies' involving loss of land and refugees, but also 'heroic moments of resistance'.

The drama of the Palestinian people brings memories from the drama of the refugees from the Asia Minor catastrophe, the political refugees during the *junta*, the Cypriot refugees who were forced to leave their fatherland by the Turkish irredentism and Attila

(Greek Parliament 1/2/1991)

The perception of common fate is amplified by a construction of the Greeks and the Palestinians as the 'underdogs' of the modern world, who have been subjected to the machinations of Great Powers. From this perspective the injustice inflicted upon the Palestinian people is a mirror image of the injustice inflicted upon Greeks by an international society, which is hypocritical and follows a policy of 'double standards'.

Pathways of Europeanisation

Substantive regulative

The relationship between Greece and Israel constitutes the most apparent issue where a fundamental misfit between the Greek and EU positions can be observed. As mentioned before Athens had made the normalisation of Greek-Israeli relations conditional upon progress towards a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict that would take into account the legitimate rights of the Palestinian people. At the same time the EC had developed an extended economic relationship with Israel and all EC member-states had established full diplomatic relations with Tel-Aviv. During the pre-accession period the Greek government was found under intense pressure to end this anomaly and the recognition of Israel was inaugurated to a 'test case for Greek solidarity with its Community partners' (Tsakaloyannis, 1984: 111). The Greek government responded to this pressure with mixed signals. On the one hand the Prime Minister clarified that 'EC membership would not affect the state of Greek-Israeli relations' (Chila, 1988: 375) and on the other hand the Foreign Minister suggested that 'Greece's accession to the Community could provide a good opportunity for a revision of the situation' (ibid.). Arguably this 'ambiguity' was warranted by the need to avoid jeopardising the country's membership prospects. More precisely, despite the absence of clear legal obligation Athens had to create the impression that she was at least contemplating to normalise its relations with Israel, since an outright denial would play in the hands of those who opposed Greek membership. In the event Greece managed to secure its accession without making the step and the political pressure on the Greek government was alleviated. The fact that Greece was the only member of the Community that had not recognised Israel *de jure* caused some unease, but the Greek government seemed to have come to terms with this 'awkward position'. In this context the continuous calls from the other European capitals as well as the European Parliament were falling on deaf ears (Sarri, 1989).

However, EC membership produced a number of contractual commitments emanating from the trade and co-operation agreement that the Community had signed with Israel (Karouzos, 1982). After a transitional period the Greek Parliament approved the additional protocols that extended this agreement to Greece despite the opposition of the parties of the left which accused the PASOK government of

reversing Greece's long standing positions under the pressure of its EC partners (Greek Parliament 11/6/1987). Interestingly the Greek Foreign Minister Theodoros Pangalos conceded that the ratification of these protocols constituted 'a contractual obligation', which the Greek Parliament had not the discretion to disregard, but at the same time he was eager to clarify that this did not amount to full diplomatic recognition (ibid.). From a nominal point of view Pangalos was right and it would be a mistake to attribute the normalisation of Greek-Israeli relations that occurred a few years later solely to the legal and political pressure exercised by the Community. As argued above these decision reflected primarily a change of strategy, which involved a different understanding of Greece's role in the region. However, the subscription to the EC's external relations upgraded *de facto* the level of relations between Greece and Israel and thus fostered the representation of the *de jure* recognition as an 'irrelevant technicality'. On the whole it could be argued that the substantive-procedural pathway played a catalytic effect in the revision of Greece's policy towards Israel in the 1990s, but was not the main cause of this revision.

With respect to the substance of the Arab-Israeli conflict there has not been a fundamental misfit between the EU and Greek positions, both of which had accepted the principle of two state solution, as the foundation for a pacification in the Middle-East. However, the consistent endorsement of pro-Arab resolutions within the UN General Assembly contradicted with the more cautious approach of most EU member-states, which despite their general disapproval of Israel's unilateral actions (extension of settlements in the occupied territories, annexation of Arab land) refrained from supporting clauses which clearly condemned Israel's expansionist policies (Chila, 1987: 351). A similar misfit was also evident with respect to the status of the PLO, which most member-states were reluctant to recognise as the official representative of the Palestinians and therefore abstained or voted against resolutions that requested that the PLO be included as an equal party in the negotiations (ibid.). As shown above, during the pre-accession period Greece partially adapted its positions to those of its prospective partners by refraining to raise objections to the US sponsored Camp David agreement and refusing to provide full diplomatic recognition to the PLO. Like in the case of the recognition of Israel, the political pressure generated by the need to secure EC membership seemed to compensate for the absence of clear legal obligations. After Greece's accession however, this political 'stick' had been lost, and the institutional framework of the EPC did not provide for a

coercion mechanisms. As a result the newly elected socialist government was able to advance its more radical pro-Arab policy, in defiance of the EU consensus. The most notable instance where Greece's position diverged significantly from that of its partners concerned the deployment of a multinational force to supervise the withdrawal of the Israeli army from Sinai as provided by the Camp David accords, which, as shown above, the Greek government had opposed because of the exclusion of the Palestinians. The opposition of the Greek government was clearly voiced in the EPC, where Greece blocked the common action that would allow for the participation of European troops in this force, requesting the inclusion of a reference to the right of the Palestinian people to self-determination. Finally Greece got its way, but the refusal of Israel to accept such a reference obliged the four European states that were willing to contribute to the Sinai peacekeeping force to issue a separate declaration (Kavakas, 2001: 45-46).

Since the mid-1980s the Greek and EU policies have started to converge and after the end of the Cold War Greece's middle-eastern policies have fallen in line with those of the EU. As I will show below, this convergence can to a great extent be attributed to Europeanisation through the other three pathways.

Substantive constitutive

The substantive-constitutive effects of EU membership can be observed at three levels. In the first place, one can make a plausible argument that policy philosophies that have first been developed at the EU level have been disseminated to Greek foreign policy-makers and altered their definition of the situation. For instance the idea that a Greek-Israeli rapprochement was not fundamentally incompatible with the preservation of the existing ties with the Arab world reflects a conviction in the possibility of 'achieving positive sum games'. In the same vein the 'Athens Dialogue' is based on the idea that low level contacts can be a fruitful means to preserve a reasonable level of contact in periods of tension and that despite the absence of formal authority ordinary people can perform diplomatic functions. Ideas such as these have been the bread and butter of the European integration process.

The influence of EU norms of appropriate foreign policy behaviour has also been substantial. As shown above during the 1980s the Greek government had adopted a rather relaxed stance vis-à-vis Palestinians involved in terrorist activities. This policy

was in line with the widely held perception that the so-called Palestinian terrorism was a legitimate act of resistance against a stronger enemy (Greek Parliament 24/1/1986: 3462). However, it generated accusations that Greece had become a safe heaven for international terrorism and was not behaving according to European standards. The more strict approach which was initiated by New Democracy in the early 1990s and followed ever since by all governments can be said to represent an effort to discard this negative image.

The most significant substantive-constitutive effects of Europeanisation are related with the long term impact of EU membership on Greek national identity. As mentioned above until the end of the Cold War the Greek foreign policy discourse was oscillating between westernist and anti-westernist directions. This oscillation reflected a more general ambivalent relationship with the West which was deeply rooted in Greek culture, and which resulted in the coexistence of positive perceptions of the West as a source of modernisation and progress with negative perceptions as a threat to national identity and idiosyncrasy (see Koliopoulos & Veremis, 2003). From this perspective membership to the EU can be said to have provided a permanent answer to the question of where Greece belongs and in so doing has enabled a more positive identification with Europe. This process took long to materialise, with perceptions of Europe during the 1980s ranging from outright hostility and suspicion for the surrendering of national sovereignty to the Brussels directorate to moderate support because of the significant inflow of Community funds (Verney, 1993: 141). After the end of the Cold War the EU has started to be presented more positively as the protector power that would preserve Greece's security and prosperity in a turbulent world but the only partial fulfilment of those aspirations generated disappointment and a temporary backlash (Ioakimidis, 2000). The shift in Greek perceptions of Europe became more evident with the coming into government of Costas Simitis, who advocated a process of modernisation of the Greek economy, society and politics whose central pillar would be the securing of Greece's position to the EU (Featherstone, 2005). In this discourse the EU was represented not only in positive terms but also as an integral part of the self. Initially this discourse met suspicion and resistance but it has gradually become dominant and the vision for a 'strong Greece in a strong Europe' was rendered the cornerstone of domestic and foreign policies.. With Greece's accession to the EMU her position in the EU became

more secure than ever before. This in turn has further strengthened the positive identification with Europe.

The strengthening of Greece's Europeaness fostered the image of Greece as a bridge between Europe and the eastern Mediterranean. To be sure, this image was not new, and Greece's accession to the Community had been hailed by both the conservatives and socialists as an important diplomatic asset, which increased considerably Greece's prestige vis-à-vis the Arab world, who would be grateful to have finally acquired a sincere friend within the EU institutions (Bitsios, 1983: 162). Nowadays however, the concept of mediation is ascribed with a different meaning. Rather than being a transmitter of Arab demands at the European level, the Greeks see themselves as the transmitters of the European values to the Arab world. The strengthening of Greece's Europeaness was also instrumental in the formulation of an antithesis between an American approach, which is unequivocally pro-Israeli and driven by strategic considerations and a European approach, which is more balanced and puts emphasis on the humanitarian dimension (Chardaloupas, 2005). In turn this has alleviated the incompatibility between the pragmatic approach warranted by the geo-political discourse and the ethical stance provided by the justice discourse.

Procedural regulative

EU membership had no impact on the division of responsibilities between the various strands of government. The structure of foreign policy-making remains centred on the Prime Minister who is responsible, together with the Foreign Minister and a limited 'core executive', for the formulation and implementation of policies (Coulombis, 1989; Stoforopoulos & Makridimitris 1997; Gikas 2003). Although since 1990 a Committee on European Affairs has been established, alongside the Foreign Affairs and Defence Committee that traditionally dealt with foreign policy issues, the role of the Parliament remains marginal (Karabarbounis 2003: 321). However, Greece's participation in the EU policy-making process has entailed significant changes at the inter-ministerial level. The main beneficiary has been the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MFA), which, apart from the main task of representing Greece in the Council of Foreign Affairs, has also been entrusted with the overall co-ordination of EU business (Ioakimidis 1993: 214). The role of co-ordinator has provided the MFA with prestige and the opportunity to have a greater say in the formulation of policies (ibid.). At the

same time, however, the nature of EU policy-making has enabled sectoral ministries to acquire some autonomy and develop their own contacts (Spanou 2003: 10). With respect to Greece's middle-eastern policy, the Ministry of Agriculture has been quite successful in brushing aside broader political considerations in favour of the defence of narrow agricultural interests (Ioakimidis, 1996).

The Ministry of Foreign Affairs has also undergone a substantial transformation, with the establishment of a General Directorate specialising in EU affairs, which is headed by a junior minister. The size and importance of this Directorate has increased considerably with the deepening of European integration. This has in turn reinforced the European orientation within the Foreign Ministry, with EU affairs constituting one of the two pillars of its structure (Passas 2005). However this Europeanisation of the policy-making process has been compromised by the fact that issues relating with the CFSP have so far been dealt with by a separate unit which is outside the European Directorate. This division of labour reflects a wider tendency to separate between high politics and low politics issues and has generated several co-ordination problems (Kavakas 2001: 94). For instance when EU's relations with Israel or the Palestinian Authority are discussed we observe the involvement of two units, which belong to different directorates (DGC1 for External Relations and DGA11 for CFSP). Given the relatively low priority accorded to the middle-eastern dimension of Greece's foreign policy the co-ordination has usually been achieved rather smoothly through consultation between the Secretary General of European Affairs and the Political Director (interview with former Secretary General of European Affairs). However, the evidence suggest that on more salient issues, such as Greek-Turkish relations, the formulation of a coherent position required a laborious process of bargaining where the Prime Minister acting as a 'broker' (Spanou, 2005).

On the whole, EU membership had some impact on Greek foreign policy-making structures, however the overall influence on the opportunity structures of foreign policy actors is unclear. Arguably this reflects a wider trend in Greek foreign policy-making: the dominance of personalities over structures (Ioakimidis, 1999).

Procedural constitutive

The socialisation of Greek policy-makers to the EU's co-operative diplomatic culture constitutes one of the most significant aspects of the Europeanisation of Greek foreign

policy. As shown above during the first years of membership, PASOK was not responsive in the appeal by other member-states to bring Greece's middle-eastern policy in line with the EU consensus. The blocking of the EPC from reaching a decision in the case of Sinai was not an isolated instance. It was embedded a broader tendency of the Greek diplomacy to use the institutional power conferred upon her by the rule of unanimity, in order to prevent unpleasant developments, even when the issues discussed were not related to vital Greek national interests. As Valinakis (1993: 321) notes, 'the veto was considered as an absolute right, which could be exercised without limitation and without regard to the possible repercussions in the way other member-states perceived Greek foreign policy interests'. This behaviour was the result of a general distrust towards the process of European integration in general and the EPC system in particular, but it also reflected an lack of understandings over the way the EU policy-making process works. For instance the Greek government employed a juridico-legalistic interpretation of her membership obligations and therefore did not feel bound the *acquis politique*:

The acceptance of the overall *acquis politique* of the Community implies for us a higher cost... it would be unacceptable for us to give the world the impression that after our entry we are obliged to adopt views that are diametrically opposed to those we upheld until now.

(Charalambopoulos quoted in Christodoulides, 1988: 288)

The ignorance of the Greek government is amply demonstrated by the fact it appeared isolated even in cases when the policies it pursued were not incompatible with the Community position. For instance during the Lebanon crisis, the declaration issued by the EPC corresponded well with the Greek views (condemnation of Israel), however the very harsh rhetoric employed by Andreas Papandreou made Greece appear as being once more at the margins of the EU consensus and obscured Greece's active involvement in the evacuation of the Palestinian leadership from Beirut, which was tacitly approved by the other member-states and the US.

Since the mid-1980s we observe a gradual departure from the indiscriminate blocking of EU decisions. The use of veto was restricted on salient issues and Greece preferred to follow a policy of 'constructive abstention' whenever there was a disagreement between the EU and Greek positions on secondary issues. For instance,

Greece did not participate in the sanctions imposed against Libya and Syria for their alleged involvement in terrorist acts but did not attempt to block the EPC from reaching a decision on the issue (Tsakaloyannis, 1993).

The familiarisation of Greek policy-makers with the EU policy-making process has also increased their ability to project national interests at the EU level. During the 1980s the primary means used by the Greek diplomacy in order to promote her policy preferences in Brussels were the blocking of the decision-making process and the insertion of footnotes in EC decision. Both these measures were ineffective. The extensive invocation of veto generated a negative reaction from other member-states, who were not receptive to Greek demands and reciprocated by searching for loopholes in order to overcome Greek objections. In the same vain the so-called 'policy of asterisks', simply resulted in the mentioning of Greece's disagreement without any substantive implication on the EU policy (Tsardanidis, C. & Stavridis, S., 2005). Greece was also quite unsuccessful in exploiting her term in the Presidency in order to insert issues of Greek interest in the EU agenda. Indeed the only contribution of the first Greek Presidency to the EU's middle-eastern policy was the revival of the Euro-Arab dialogue which had been postponed since 1978 because of the disagreement over the Camp David accords. However, this initiative of the Greek government was ill prepared and did not produce any substantive results (Rozakis, 1982).

Since the 1990s we observe a shift to a more 'offensive participation' (Kavakas, 2001). Apart from the fact that Greek policy-makers engage in frequent consultations with their European counterparts, Greece also seems more keen to engage in package deals and coalition building. For instance the third Greek Presidency in 1994 was incorporated in a broader effort from the part of the three big Mediterranean member-states (Italy, Spain and France) to promote the Mediterranean dimension of the EU's external relations (Ioakimidis, 1996). Although it would be an overstatement to claim that Athens had had a protagonistic role in the development of the Euro-Mediterranean Partnership the mere attempt to become actively involved in the EU's 'southern club' contrast highly with the first years when Greece appeared to be the 'champion of self-willed policy' (Axt, 1997: 182). It is also important to note that the attempt to promote Greek interests as European interests is accompanied by a readiness to accept general European solutions as opposed to specific national ones.

Conditions of Europeanisation

With respect to the mediating conditions of EU influence, the relatively quick and smooth acceptance of the *de facto* upgrading of economic relations between Greece and Israel, resulting from the implementation of the EU-Israeli trade and co-operation agreement seems to confirm the hypothesis that the existence of binding rules increases the likelihood of adaptation with existing EU policies. On the political front, the process of Europeanisation was longer and necessitated a change in strategy which was the result of the functioning of the second and fourth pathways rather than coercion. Moreover, the difficulties that the EU faced in the formulation of a coherent policy vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict seem to have alleviated some of the pressure felt by the Greek governments, since Greece's pro-Arab inclination was seen as one end in a continuum of European positions rather than an opposition to a European mainstream.

With respect to the domestic factors foreign policy is a constant source of disagreement among political parties. However, in most cases the executive leadership has been strong enough in order to bring dissidents in line with the governmental policies. The notable exception to the rule of strong executives was Constantinos Mitsotakis (1990-1993) who had a parliamentary majority of only two seats, because of the highly proportional electoral law, and therefore had to take into account the views of his party. Interestingly, the most notable shift in Greece's middle-eastern policy, the *de jure* recognition of Israel, occurred during his term in office. This paradox can be explained by two factors. First, at the time his government was newly elected and the Greek public was eager for political stability after a prolonged period of turbulence which had brought three consecutive elections. Second, the Middle-East does not constitute a core priority of Greek foreign policy. As a result any attempt to provoke a political crisis over Israel's recognition would be meaningless if not 'suicidal'. The process of the Europeanisation of Greek foreign policy has been facilitated by the existence of a community of academics, journalists and political activists who have been very influential in re-articulating the ambivalence in Greek national identity as a struggle between an 'underdog culture', which prevented Greece from exploiting the opportunities she had been presented with, and an emerging reformist culture, which would allow Greece to westernise and make full use of her outstanding potential (see for example the contributions of

Diamandouros, Keridis and Tsoukalis, in Allison and Nicolaides, 1997). Through the creation of this dualism, the eastern elements of Greek identity have been discredited as parochial and the modernisation project of Costas Simitis was legitimised as the only realistic prospect for Greece's future. This dualism was also reproduced at the level of the academia with the articulation of a distinction between a 'nationalistic', 'pessimistic', 'confrontational' and 'defensive' ethnocentrism and a 'realistic', 'optimistic', 'cautious' and 'pro-active' 'Europeanism' (see Couloumbis and Dalis, 1997; for a critical overview see Constantinidis, 2003). Since the mid-1990s the so-called Europeanist camp had a substantial influence in foreign policy-making either directly, through the participation in various policy-making bodies, or indirectly through the promotion of specific ideas.

With respect to the external dimension there is little doubt that the end of the Cold War and the subsequent emergence of the US as the sole superpower discredited the alternative visions of Greece's international role and consolidated the hegemony of the westernist ideology across the political spectrum. In addition Greece's stance has been heavily influenced by evolutions in regional politics. For instance, the controversy generated by the bombing of the Iraqi nuclear reactor by Israel is said to have alleviated the pressure exercised on the Greek government to fully recognise Israel before accession (Tsakaloyannis, 1984). The breakout of the first *intifanda* seems to have had a similar effect in freezing the Greek-Israeli rapprochement and delaying the normalisation of bilateral relations. On the other hand there is little doubt that the domination of the moderates within the PLO and the Israeli government and the subsequent advent of the Middle-East Process in 1990s facilitated the transition to a less confrontational policy.

Conclusion

In this paper I have attempted to provide a theoretically informed account on the impact of EU membership on national foreign policies, with particular emphasis on Greece's stance vis-à-vis the Arab-Israeli conflict. My analysis has been based on a constructivist understanding of foreign policy, the identification of four pathways of Europeanisation and the specification of several mediating conditions at the EU, domestic and external levels.

I have demonstrated that Greece's stance has evolved from an unequivocal support for the Arab side to a more balanced approach, which however cannot be characterised as genuinely equidistant. In terms of the theoretical framework this change can be depicted as transformational because it entails a change in the strategies used without challenging the essence of the four discourses upon which Greece's middle-eastern policy is based. Indeed Greek preferences in the Middle-East continue to be shaped by the same considerations: the strengthening of Greece's historic relationship with the region, the containment of Turkey, the acquisition of a privileged position in the geopolitical map of the region. The stability of Greek perceptions is even more evident in the case of the justice discourse, which portrays the pro-Arab inclination of Greece's foreign policy as an ethical stance.

This trajectory of Greek foreign policy has been heavily influenced by EU membership. On the substantive level the need to bring her policies in line with the EU consensus forced Athens to accept the *de facto* upgrading of her relations with Israel, even though the conditions that she had set for such a move (i.e. progress towards a comprehensive resolution of the Arab-Israeli conflict) had not been accomplished. This regulative impact has been particularly evident during the first years of membership, with Greece merely accepting her contractual commitments. However, over time we observe constitutive effects as well. More precisely the Greek policy seems to have been inspired and constrained by policy ideas and norms of appropriate behaviour which had been developed at the EU level. Most importantly EU membership seems to have contributed in reducing the ambivalent relationship of Greek national identity with Europe and the West. The more positive identification with Europe has fostered Greece's self-image as a mediator and transmitter of European values. It has also helped to resolve the fundamental contradiction between Greece's geopolitical and ethical considerations. On the procedural level Europeanisation has occurred mainly through the constitutive pathway and is evidenced in the more active participation of Greek national officials in the EU policy-making process.

The conceptual model that I have proposed enables to enhance our understanding of the Europeanisation of national foreign policy. Out of the four pathways that I have proposed only the third one (procedural-regulative) seems to have had no significant effect. In the same vain although it is not possible, within a single case, to confirm the tentative hypotheses advanced with respect to the role of the mediating

factors, I have at least provided evidence that render them plausible. In this respect I propose two avenues for further research. The first is to apply the model in other issue areas. This would allow us to examine how the patterns of Europeanisation change between policy areas where the EU is deeply involved and policy areas where it is not. If my model is correct, then we should observe some Europeanisation even in those areas where EU competence is very limited, with defence policy being the most obvious case. Moreover, it would be interesting to know if patterns of Europeanisation change between policy areas that are dominated by security considerations (such as the Arab Israeli conflict) and areas that are related with low politics concerns (such as the EMP). In addition it would be interesting to know to what extent the salience of an issue area (i.e. whether or not it appears high in national priorities) has an impact on the Europeanisation process. The second avenue for further research is to use the model in cross-country comparisons. In this way the model could serve in the building up of a (long overdue) theory of foreign policy Europeanisation.

Notes

ⁱ The term foreign policy discourse has been used by Ole Waever as an instrument of explaining foreign policy. My understanding of discourse is heavily influenced by this approach, especially as far as the causal implications on foreign policy outcomes are concerned, but does not adopt the structural understanding of how foreign policy discourse is formed and evolves over time (see Larsen 1997; Waever 1998).

ⁱⁱ The three levels of change are inspired by Peter Hall's (1993) policy paradigm which is defined as a 'framework of ideas and standards that specifies not only the goal of policy and the kind of instruments that can be used to attain them, but also the very nature of the problems that they mean to be addressing'.

ⁱⁱⁱ For an elaboration of these four dimensions of Europeanisation see Diez et al. (2005).

^{iv} The concept of pathway has been inspired by the conceptual framework used in the context of a project that studies the impact of the European Union on the transformation of border conflicts. However, the pathways I identify are slightly different.

For more details see: www.euborderconf.bham.ac.uk.

^v For a similar argument and an attempt to establish typological relationship between levels of influence of EU policy and degrees of domestic adaptation see Borzel (2002).

^{vi} These are inspired by research undertaken in Comparative Politics (see Haverland 2000; Heritier et al. 2001; Radaelli 2003; Borzel 2005). Although they have been developed mainly to allow cross-country comparisons, I believe that they can be applied in one country in order to examine variations across time and issue areas.

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